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The Natural Logic of 
Morals and of Laws 
Ray Jackendoff † 
The theme of this special issue is “Is Morality Universal, 
and Should the Law Care?” For me, this question provokes the 
further question of what morality and the law are. That is what 
most of this essay is about. The last two sections address the 
initial question, primarily dealing with laying out its multiple 
ambiguity. Few of its readings have easy answers; the best I 
can do in the present discussion is to see what is at stake. 
I. THE COGNITIVE PERSPECTIVE 
I come to these issues from the perspective of a linguist 
applying the theoretical approach of cognitive science to social 
cognition.1 The focus of my inquiry is the system of knowledge 
that enables an individual to understand social and cultural 
interactions, within the context of social institutions. Morals 
and laws, contracts and customs would not exist were it not for 
the human minds that create them, and anyone who does not 
understand them cannot function in human society. I therefore 
find it of interest to examine the cognitive system that affords 
such understanding. 
This inquiry is modeled on the approach to language of 
generative linguistics.2 Like a culture, a language exists only by 
virtue of the individuals using it. With a few pathological 
exceptions, all humans have a language, but they do not all 
have the same language. Generative linguistics therefore takes 
the object of inquiry to be not “the language in the world,” but 
rather the system in the mind/brain that gives rise to the 
  
 † Center for Cognitive Studies, Tufts University and Santa Fe Institute. 
Thanks to Larry Solan, Samuel Jay Keyser, and Hildy Dvorak for valuable discussion 
of the issues treated here.  
 1 For much more detail, see RAY JACKENDOFF, LANGUAGE, CONSCIOUSNESS, 
CULTURE: ESSAYS ON MENTAL STRUCTURE (2007). 
 2 NOAM CHOMSKY, LANGUAGE AND MIND 13, 16, 18 (1968); NOAM CHOMSKY, 
ON NATURE AND LANGUAGE 47-48 (Adriana Belletti & Luigi Rizzi eds., 2002). 
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ability to speak and understand linguistic utterances, as well 
as the “hard-wired” system that makes it possible for children 
to acquire this ability.3 
Mikhail and Hauser develop an approach to morality in 
this general vein.4 Following the approach of Rawls in A Theory 
of Justice,5 they draw a parallel between the ability to make 
moral judgments and the ability to make grammaticality 
judgments, and they advocate accounting for the former ability 
in terms of a “moral grammar.”6 For my part, I find Rawls’s 
parallel a bit shallow. Being able to make grammaticality 
judgments is not the point of linguistic competence—it is 
merely a side effect of being able to use language for 
communication. By contrast, the ability to make judgments of 
justice or morality is the point of moral competence: it helps 
determine how one behaves toward the person being judged.7 
What I take to be a more deeply grounded antecedent 
for my approach comes from John Macnamara, who draws a 
parallel between moral reasoning and intuitive geometry.8 Just 
as one has an intuitive sense of the geometrical landscape, one 
has a sense of the social landscape, unconsciously organized in 
terms of a set of fundamental social categories and relations. 
Just as the basic unit in the conceptualization of physical space 
is a physical object, a basic unit in the conceptualization of 
social space is a person, the locus of intention, responsibility, 
rights, and status in the community. Possible social 
relationships among persons include kinship, dominance, 
friendship, love, enmity, competition, cooperative partnership, 
and obligation. Another basic unit is the social group, which 
includes, among other things, families, clans, clubs, cliques, 
teams, religions, and nations. Members of a group identify 
themselves with the group, feel loyalty to the group, and under 
  
 3 STEVEN PINKER, THE LANGUAGE INSTINCT: HOW THE MIND CREATES 
LANGUAGE 18 (HarperCollins 2000) (1994); RAY JACKENDOFF, FOUNDATIONS OF 
LANGUAGE ch. 4 (Oxford Univ. Press 2002). 
 4 MARC D. HAUSER, MORAL MINDS 165 (2006); John Mikhail, Universal 
Moral Grammar: Theory, Evidence and the Future, 11 TRENDS IN COGNITIVE SCI. 143 
(2007).  
 5 JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 47 (1971). 
 6 HAUSER, supra note 4, at 43; Mikhail, supra note 4, at 144. 
 7 Dupoux and Jacob offer other arguments against Mikhail and Hauser’s 
conceptualization of the problem, though I am not sure I endorse them. See Emmanuel 
Dupoux and Pierre Jacob, Universal Moral Grammar: A Critical Appraisal, 11 TRENDS 
IN COGNITIVE SCI. 373, 373-78 (2007). 
 8 John Macnamara, The Development of Moral Reasoning and the 
Foundations of Geometry, 21 J. FOR THE THEORY OF SOC. BEHAV. 125, 128 (1991). 
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many circumstances favor fellow group members over non-
group members. Again, I stress that all these units and 
relationships exist only in virtue of the minds of the individuals 
involved.  
I concur with Mikhail and Hauser that it is of interest to 
explore a theory of “moral grammar,”9 but I believe it is best 
embedded in the broader context of a theory of social cognition. 
The entities with which moral principles are concerned are 
precisely persons, social groups, and the relationships among 
them. Returning to the topic of this special issue, these very 
same entities are the locus of laws. I wish to show that moral 
principles and laws are quite distinct sorts of mental entities, 
playing different roles in the logic of social cognition. In order 
to show this, it is first necessary to discuss the properties they 
share—not only with each other, but also with other sorts of 
principles.  
II. SOCIAL NORMS 
Morals and certain sorts of laws fall into the general 
space of social norms. A norm (as I will use the term) focuses 
on the consequences of a state or action for a generic 
individual. 
(1) If any person P is in state S or performs action A, consequence C 
will ensue, to P’s benefit or detriment. 
Two things make this more specialized than an ordinary rule of 
inference. First, P is a generic individual, not a particular 
person. Second, P stands to benefit from, or be hurt by, the 
consequence; that is, it turns out to be good or bad for P to be 
in state S or to perform action A.  
As stated, (1) is too broad for our purposes, since it still 
includes cases such as (2a) and (2b).  
(2) a. If someone is too short, they won’t be able to reach the bar. 
 b. If anyone eats that, they’ll get sick.  
These cases concern physical consequences of states and 
actions. In social norms, the consequence involves the 
intervention or mediation of other individuals—as it were, a 
social counterpart of physical causality. For example, in (3), the 
awarding of the prize and the shooting depend on the 
  
 9 HAUSER, supra note 4, at 43; Mikhail, supra note 4, at 150. 
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intentional action of other individuals in reaction to the actor’s 
action.  
(3) a. If anyone invents a better mousetrap, they’ll win a prize. 
 b. If anyone crosses the border without a passport, they’ll be 
shot. 
Some social norms involve only a state of the person P—
something for which they cannot be responsible (these are, I 
gather, real norms from real societies): 
(4) a. If anyone is an identical twin, they’ll be very much admired. 
 b. If anyone is an identical twin, they’ll be shunned and 
reviled. 
However, in the class of norms under which morals and laws 
fall, person P performs an intentional action—just being short 
or a twin is not enough. Yet, such norms may also involve non-
intentional characteristics of P (the italicized parts of (5)): 
(5) a. If anyone of such-and-such ethnicity lives here after such-
and-such a date, their property will be confiscated. 
 b. If anyone who is a woman participates in an ordination 
ceremony, she will be excommunicated. 
Norms can be expressed in many different linguistic 
forms. For instance, the conditions on P and P’s actions can be 
stated in various ways. 
(6) a. The inventor of a better mousetrap will be rewarded. 
 b. A woman participating in an ordination ceremony will be 
excommunicated. 
An important way of expressing norms is with the modal verbs 
should, must, and may, which leave the good or bad 
consequences implicit: 
(7) a. X should do Y = “If X does Y, a good consequence for X will 
ensue.” 
 b. X shouldn’t do Y = “If X does Y, a bad consequence for X will 
ensue.” 
 c. X must do Y = “If X doesn’t do Y, a bad consequence for X 
will ensue.” 
 d. X mustn’t do Y = “If X does Y, a bad consequence for X will 
ensue.” 
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 e. X may do Y = “If X does Y, no bad consequence for X will 
ensue.” 
 f. X may not do Y = “If X does Y, a bad consequence for X will 
ensue.” 
Many of these linguistic forms do not distinguish norms 
from other kinds of inferential statements. For instance, the 
statements in (3)-(6), with the modal verb will, can be read 
simply as predictions rather than norms. Similarly, X should 
do Y can be read simply as utilitarian advice rather than as a 
norm; for example, in It might rain, so you should take an 
umbrella. So the question is: What makes a norm a norm? 
The conceptual difference between a norm and a 
prediction has to do with what I will call the epistemic attitude 
under which it is understood. The philosophical literature often 
speaks rather loosely of “propositional attitudes such as belief, 
desire, etc.” and then concentrates on belief.10 Propositional 
attitudes are one sort of epistemic attitude; they involve one’s 
commitment to the truth or falsity of a statement, as in (8). 
(8) Joe thinks/doubts/imagines/claims that the earth is flat. 
However, another class of epistemic attitudes concerns 
commitment to contemplated actions, for example: 
(9) Joe intends/plans/is willing to bake a cake. 
Many English verbs express propositional attitudes 
when followed by a that-clause, but actional attitudes when 
followed by an infinitival clause. 
(10) a. John decided/agreed/learned/swore that the earth is flat. 
(propositional) 
 b. John decided/agreed/learned/swore to bake a cake. (actional) 
It is important to observe that this correlation is not absolute. 
For instance, believe and claim still express propositional 
attitudes with infinitivals; and intend followed by a subjunctive 
that-clause expresses an attitude toward an unexpressed 
action.  
(11) a. Joe believes/claims the earth to be flat. (= “Joe 
believes/claims that the earth is flat”) 
  
 10 See, e.g., JERRY A. FODOR, PSYCHOSEMANTICS 10-11 (MIT Press 1987); 
HILARY PUTNAM, REPRESENTATION AND REALITY chs. 3, 4, 7 (1988); ROBERT C. 
STALNAKER, INQUIRY 15, 18-19, 25 (MIT Press 1984). 
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 b. Joe intends that Sue come too. (= “Joe intends to bring it 
about that Sue comes too”) 
There are further, trickier cases as well.11 That is, the 
semantics of epistemic attitudes is not at all mirrored one-to-
one by grammatical expressions; there are only tendencies.  
I go through this because in addition to commitment to 
propositions and to actions, there appears to be a third and 
more complicated kind of epistemic attitude, namely 
commitment to norms. Consider for instance the norm that one 
should not steal. If one is committed to this norm, one has the 
following attitudes: 
(12) Commitment to norm “One shouldn’t steal” = 
 a. Intention not to steal (actional attitude);  
 b. Prediction of bad consequences of stealing (propositional 
attitude); 
 c. Approval of bad consequences of stealing, even if the violator 
is oneself. 
None of these on its own constitutes commitment to the norm. 
Having an intention not to steal (12a) does not automatically 
entail accepting punishment if one steals, nor does it entail an 
attitude that stealing is bad. The belief that there exists a 
norm against stealing allows one to predict that stealing will be 
punished (12b), but one may steal anyway. And if one does 
avoid stealing because of this prediction, it may be merely to 
avoid punishment, a purely utilitarian strategy.  
(12c) gets closer to the heart of the matter: committing 
to a norm involves, among other things, a sense of the justice of 
the consequence, even if it is to one’s own disadvantage. Could 
(12c) alone be the only condition necessary for commitment to a 
norm? This depends on whether you think that someone who 
steals all the time and then willingly accepts punishment is 
committed to the norm. I personally wouldn’t count this as 
commitment. It seems to me that all three conditions are 
necessary. 
What kind of attitude is (12c)? It might be couched as a 
propositional attitude, such as a belief that being punished for 
stealing is just. But in this way of putting it, the term just, 
meaning roughly “normatively appropriate,” simply conceals 
the problem within a single word. Regardless of how this 
  
 11 For details, see JACKENDOFF, supra note 1, at ch. 8. 
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question is resolved, I am inclined to see commitment to a 
norm as an epistemic attitude distinct from and more complex 
than both propositional and actional attitudes. The semantic 
distinction among these attitudes is to some extent obscured by 
the fact that the linguistic expression of norms overlaps with 
that of predictions and advice.  
Both morals and relevant parts of law fall under this 
logic of norms. In particular, they both concern the 
consequences of certain actions for the actor. However, they 
diverge in what those consequences are. Very roughly, in the 
logic of morals, the consequence of the actor’s action concerns 
what everyone in the community thinks of the actor—the 
actor’s moral reputation. In turn, the actor’s reputation affects 
the way people interact with him or her: one interacts 
differently with “good” people than with “bad” ones.  
The logic of laws is quite different. Laws (of the relevant 
sort) are obligations and rights created in the name of the state 
(or other body of authority such as a church) by its authorized 
representatives. The consequences of violating a law are 
imposed by the representatives of the state, in the state’s 
name, and consist of direct punishment or, rarely, it seems to 
me, reward.  
Morality and the law also differ in what sorts of actions 
they pertain to. Some sorts of actions, such as assault and 
theft, fall under the purview of both. But some fall only under 
morality, such as helping old ladies cross the street; and some 
fall only under the law, such as driving on the right-hand side. 
Lying is a moral violation; the corresponding legal violation is 
lying under oath. Depending on the legal and moral system in 
question, some sorts of actions fall under both, but in 
conflicting fashion. An obvious case would be the evil landlord 
in the melodrama who is evicting the poor widow, in 
compliance with his legal rights, but in violation of the moral 
code; more extreme (and real) would be actions carried out 
under the Nuremberg Laws. A case in the other direction 
would be civil disobedience in the tradition of Gandhi and Dr. 
King, in which illegal actions are carried out in the name of a 
“higher” morality.  
We now go into the logic of morals and laws in 
somewhat more detail. 
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III. VARIATION AMONG MORAL SYSTEMS 
Morals fall under a larger set of norms, which includes 
norms of social appropriateness (or manners or etiquette), 
norms of “proper” language use, dietary customs, customs of 
dress, and religious norms (although the latter, if enforced by 
an authority such as the Catholic Church, take on the status of 
legal codes). Each of these sorts of norms attaches social values 
of “good” or “bad” to a particular class of actions.  
Following the lead of standard moral philosophy, recent 
work on the cognitive science of morality such as that by 
Mikhail12 and Hauser13 has taken the view that morality can 
and should be studied in isolation: in order to get at the root of 
human nature, we ought to strip away the relative 
superficiality of social convention, looking for universal 
principles of moral judgment. The argument rests in part on 
widely cited experiments by Turiel, in which young children 
readily distinguish those norms that we could “decide to 
change” (social conventions) from those that we could not 
(genuine moral principles).14 The latter are often taken to be 
timeless, universal, and objective.15  
I find this approach too limited for several reasons. 
First, often the only moral principle explored in this research 
(most frequently using so-called trolley problems) is “Don’t hurt 
people.” To be sure, the moral tradeoffs explored by trolley 
problems are rich and complex, but they represent only one of 
many domains of moral judgment. Haidt, following suggestions 
of Shweder et al.,16 proposes that moral systems potentially 
deal with five issues: harm (as in trolley problems), fairness, 
ingroup-outgroup dynamics and loyalty, authority and respect, 
and purity.17  
Within these issues, cultures differ in what they 
themselves consider moral. Two hundred years ago, large 
  
 12 Mikhail, supra note 4. 
 13 HAUSER, supra note 4, at 165. 
 14 ELLIOTT TURIEL, THE DEVELOPMENT OF SOCIAL KNOWLEDGE: MORALITY 
AND CONVENTION chs. 3-6 (1983). 
 15 Id. at 34-36. 
 16 Richard A. Shweder, Nancy C. Much, Manamohan Mahapatra & Lawrence 
Park, The “Big Three” of Morality (Autonomy, Community, Divinity) and the “Big 
Three” Explanations of Suffering, in MORALITY AND HEALTH 119, 130-68 (A. Brandt & 
P. Rozin eds., 1997). 
 17 Jonathan Haidt, The New Synthesis in Moral Psychology, 316 SCI. 1001 
(2007). 
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portions of the world considered slavery morally acceptable. 
That doesn’t make the issue of slavery just a matter of “culture-
dependent social convention” for us. Similarly for sexual mores: 
questions as basic as whether unmarried men and women can 
be in each other’s company are in some cultures taken to be 
matters of morality, even though for us they are not. Even 
within a culture, subcultures may differ, and each may regard 
its own sense of morality as the only proper one. Doris and 
Stich cite issues such as abortion, capital punishment, and gay 
marriage as cases where people’s moral judgments diverge 
radically, just within American culture.18 
Moral codes also differ in how they view retaliation for 
harm inflicted.19 In an “honor-based” culture, retaliation is 
considered the morally correct response. Alternatively, 
retaliation may be considered morally acceptable, though not 
obligatory: “Well, if you want to retaliate, okay, we’ll look the 
other way.” A third option is to view retaliation as 
unacceptable: “Turn the other cheek.” Any particular moral 
code may adopt one or another of these stances for different 
cases, leading to a rich, though constrained, set of possibilities.  
A theory of moral intuitions based on trolley problems 
and the like also overlooks an important factor in the morality 
of “don’t hurt people”: this principle is deeply intertwined with 
the logic of groups (Haidt’s ingroup-outgroup issue).20 For 
instance, in the context of a war, killing an enemy, i.e. a 
member of another group, is typically regarded as good rather 
than immoral. More generally, cultures differ in how one is 
supposed to treat members of other groups. It may be 
considered moral to live and let live or even to be generous to a 
stranger. Alternatively, it may be considered moral to look out 
for one’s own and let the devil take the rest of them.21 
Another reason not to try to abstract universal moral 
principles away from social conventions is that what looks to us 
like a moral principle and what looks to us like a social 
  
 18 John M. Doris & Stephen P. Stich, As a Matter of Fact: Empirical 
Perspectives on Ethics, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY 114, 
114-152. (Frank Jackson & Michael Smith eds., 2005). 
 19 RICHARD E. NISBETT & DOV COHEN, CULTURE OF HONOR: THE PSYCHOLOGY 
OF VIOLENCE IN THE SOUTH 2 (Westview Press 1996). 
 20 Haidt, supra note 17, at 1001. 
 21 This parameter could be incorporated into trolley problems by, for 
example, making the people on the track spies of a foreign power or by making the man 
on the other track a member of one’s family. It is obvious how this might change 
subjects’ biases, but the experiment should be done. I suspect there would be 
interesting crosscultural differences. 
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convention may be treated as commensurate within the culture 
itself. For instance, we might well think that not eating pork 
and not marrying someone of another faith are matters of 
social convention. On the other hand, among some Orthodox 
Jews, violations of these norms lead to the same sort of 
indignation toward the perpetrators as does, for example, child 
abuse, which we would be inclined to agree is a moral violation.  
We are now in a position to address the first part of the 
theme question, “Is morality universal?” The answer is that a 
sense of morality is universal, but particular morals are not. 
Rather, particular moral systems are associated with 
particular social groups of various sizes. A group may even 
recognize its own particular variations on morality: “We hold 
ourselves to a higher standard” or “If we do this, our gods curse 
us, but it’s different for you.” This does not mean that moral 
systems can vary without limit: For example, I would not 
expect to find a moral system that reversed the asymmetry 
between ingroup and outgroup, i.e. that treated outsiders better 
than insiders.  
Nevertheless, there is a strong impulse, even among 
moral philosophers and psychologists of morality, to want 
morals to be objective, universal, and timeless:22 “If morality is 
relative, then there is no morality.” “If morality is relative, 
then why couldn’t Hitler be considered moral in his own 
terms?” (And we can equally imagine the Nazis saying, “Only 
we recognize the true objective morality.”) We must resist this 
impulse and not let it blind us to the obvious facts of moral 
diversity. Instead, we might ask why people have such an 
impulse.  
Consider the task of a child learning the system, trying 
to figure out what’s good behavior and what’s bad. From the 
point of view of the child, for a very good first approximation, 
the moral system is universal: everybody around you shares it. 
It is timeless: it was there before you were. And it is objective: 
it operates as inexorably as gravity. For those normative 
principles that are explicitly taught, the mode of teaching is 
“This is the way it’s done; this is what you have to do; this is 
what happens if you don’t.” Moreover, since the operation of the 
moral system depends primarily on what other people think of 
you, not on what you think of yourself, you are not at liberty to 
  
 22 For instance, Hauser and Mikhail seem to make such presumptions. 
Hauser, supra note 4, at 165; Mikhail, supra note 4, at 144. 
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change it. If you don’t like the system, your only options are to 
grin and bear it, to find a group whose morals better suit your 
taste, or to persuade your community to adopt your standards. 
Only the first of these is open to a child, and even for adults, 
the other two are problematic.  
I conjecture, then, that children come to the learning of 
social norms from the stance of this first approximation, 
namely moral realism and absolutism. They take the prevailing 
standards of conduct to be as much a real part of the social 
world as the prevailing kinds of food are part of the physical 
world. With this stance, the child does not have to consider 
whether these standards are right. They are right because 
that’s what people do. This stance thus provides a way of 
helping with the problem of acquisition, a way which while 
philosophically questionable, does the job of integrating the 
child into the community.  
I would further conjecture that this naïve stance does 
not altogether go away with experience—that it persists to 
some degree in adults, especially those without much 
experience in multiple cultural environments. This stance 
might be thought of then as “folk metaethics,” more or less on 
par with “folk physics” and “folk psychology.”23  
IV. THE LOGIC OF MORALS (WITH APOLOGIES TO MORAL 
PHILOSOPHERS) 
Let us now look at the logic of morals as a special case of 
norms. For convenience, I will use the term “normative 
judgment” for a judgment made in the domains of morals, 
etiquette, and so on. The basic structure of a normative 
judgment is that, on the basis of one of these principles or 
conventions, an intentional action by a particular person is 
assigned a normative value, which may be positive (“good”), 
negative (“bad”), or neutral (“okay”). Positive and negative 
normative values may in addition have a rough magnitude 
(“very/sort of good/bad,” “better/worse than X,” “not as good/bad 
as X”). As discussed in the experimental literature, these 
judgments are often immediate and intuitive, and people 
sometimes have a hard time justifying their choices.24 
  
 23 Folk psychology: STEPHEN P. STICH, FROM FOLK PSYCHOLOGY TO 
COGNITIVE SCIENCE: THE CASE AGAINST BELIEF 1-6 (MIT Press 1983). Folk physics: 
DANIEL J. POVINELLI, FOLK PHYSICS FOR APES 2-5 (Oxford Univ. Press 2000). 
 24 HAUSER, supra note 4, at 124-25. 
394 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 75:2 
 
Moreover, one of Hauser’s most striking results is that 
although his subjects are highly uniform in their judgments, 
they give widely divergent reasons, suggesting that 
justifications of moral judgments are often post hoc 
rationalizations.25  
It is important to distinguish normative judgments from 
other sorts of value judgments that characterize people, objects, 
and actions as “good” or “bad.”26 All the way back to Plato, the 
literature on values has muddied these distinctions. English 
offers tiny grammatical cues, italicized in (13), that help tell 
the kinds of value apart.27 
(13) a. It is good of Bill to help the old lady across the street. 
(Normative value) 
  Bill is good to help the old lady cross the street. (Normative 
value) 
 b. It is good for Bill to eat broccoli. (Utilitarian value: benefit 
or cost) 
 c. It feels good to take a shower in the morning. (Affective 
value) 
 d. Bill is good at baking cakes. (Skill/prowess) 
 e. This knife is good for cutting plastic. (Quality of artifact for 
intended function)  
Judgments of normative value come with an emotional 
or affective component. An action of positive normative value 
may be viewed with approval or admiration; this affect also 
may accompany an action that exhibits positive skill, such as 
winning a competition. However, the reaction to actions of 
negative normative value—indignation or taking offense—
appears to be unique to normative value. An action that 
exhibits negative skill, such as losing a race, is viewed perhaps 
with disappointment (unless, of course, one is rooting for 
someone else), but with indignation only if there is some 
suspicion of cheating, a moral offense. These affective 
components are sometimes taken to be the defining feature of 
  
 25 Id. at 128. 
 26 R. M. HARE, THE LANGUAGE OF MORALS 137-50 (Oxford Univ. Press 1964) 
(1952); JACKENDOFF, supra note 1, at 290-93. 
 27 JACKENDOFF, supra note 1, at 301; GEORG HENRIK VON WRIGHT, THE 
VARIETIES OF GOODNESS 8-12 (1963). 
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morals.28 To be sure, they are important to cement the force of 
moral judgments, but they alone do not lead to the character of 
moral reasoning, which we now turn to.  
Being able to make normative judgments of people’s 
actions is not an end in itself. One uses normative judgments of 
actions for two purposes: to help decide whether someone is a 
good or bad person, and to guide one’s own choice of 
contemplated actions. Consider first the former. The basic 
principle is that a person who does good things is thereby a 
good person; a person who does bad things is thereby a bad 
person. A more sophisticated version of the principle is that 
one’s good acts add to one’s total “goodness” and one’s bad acts 
subtract from it.  
The result of the addition to or subtraction from one’s 
“moral record” is far less rigid than arithmetic: the relative 
weights of current and past events are highly subjective. We 
intuitively recognize this subjectivity in statements like these 
in response to the very same action: 
(14) a. Even though what you just did was horrible, I’m not going 
to hold it against you. 
 b. What you did was so horrible that it wiped out my whole 
good opinion of you. 
A further odd aspect of this reasoning is that the 
entailment tends to be treated as two-way, as if everything that 
good people do is good and everything that bad people do is 
bad. This leads to the possibility of entirely opposite 
rationalizations of people’s actions, depending on one’s opinion 
of them: 
(15) a. The president is bad, so whatever he does, no matter how 
harmless it looks, must have a pernicious motive behind it. 
 b. The president is good, so whatever he does, no matter how 
superficially bad it looks, must be in our best interests. 
(The latter reasoning is often used for God too.)  
Judging that someone is a good or bad person is not an 
end in itself either. Rather, it helps establish the person’s 
reputation, or the esteem in which one holds the person. Esteem 
is a composite of many factors; in addition to one’s moral worth, 
it includes at least one’s dominance, one’s relevant skills, one’s 
attractiveness, one’s wealth, and one’s clan (as in otherwise 
  
 28 See Doris & Stich, supra note 18, at 128. 
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undistinguished Kennedy or Bush offspring). In turn, the 
esteem in which a person is held affects how much other people 
want to associate with him or her; being able to associate with 
someone esteemed adds to one’s own feeling of self-worth: “Can 
you believe it? I met Nelson Mandela today!” Again, moral 
standing is only one part of this equation: I imagine a lot of 
people might get a thrill from meeting Al Capone or Stalin too.29 
Which leads to the second use of normative judgments: 
to help choose one’s own actions. A perennial philosophical 
question is: “Why be good?” One reason to act in accordance 
with normative principles is out of concern for others’ opinions: 
one wants to have a good reputation, to be held in esteem. The 
attractiveness bestowed by esteem gives one power over others 
and therefore increased opportunity for potentially beneficial 
situations. Hence, in the end, a good reputation is a social 
resource and potentially an economic resource, and so being 
good is ultimately for utilitarian ends. In fact, as Richard 
Alexander points out, for this purpose, all that really matters is 
the appearance of moral behavior30—and we are all familiar 
with cases where exemplary behavior is only apparent.  
This reason for being good strikes many people as 
calculated and even cynical. Yet evolutionary psychologists who 
ask why humans have developed a moral sense invariably 
arrive at this as the factor that makes the moral sense 
adaptive.31 They see moral codes as a way of enforcing 
cooperation in large groups, in that group members who do not 
conform to the code, in particular free riders on the benefits of 
cooperation, come to be shunned.32  
Alexander goes one step further and darker, asking how 
large-scale cooperation could have benefited early hominids.33 
He conjectures that the principal predators on early hominids 
were other hominids, based on paleontological evidence of mass 
slaughter of hominids carried out by stone tools.34 If Alexander 
is correct, there was safety in numbers: the bigger a group, the 
  
 29 We use the term notorious to describe people who have a large reputation 
despite low moral standing. 
 30 RICHARD D. ALEXANDER, THE BIOLOGY OF MORAL SYSTEMS 95 (2d ed. 
2009). 
 31 See, e.g., id. at 93-97; ROBERT BOYD & PETER J. RICHERSON, THE ORIGIN 
AND EVOLUTION OF CULTURES 129 (2005).  
 32 ALEXANDER, supra note 30, at 94; BOYD & RICHERSON, supra note 31, at 
167. 
 33 ALEXANDER, supra note 30, at 79. 
 34 Id. at 79. 
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more likely it was to prevail over other groups in battle. Hence 
larger groups would have an adaptive advantage—which 
unfortunately would lead to greater opportunity for free riders. 
The cognitive innovation of a moral sense, instantiated in 
moral codes, offered a means of keeping free riders in check, 
thereby maintaining larger and more powerful groups, which 
in turn afforded more surviving offspring.  
Regrettably, I find Alexander’s proposal all too 
plausible. It helps explain the highly restrictive character of 
many moral codes (though not the frequent extreme gender 
biases). It also helps explain the group-based character of 
normative codes, in particular the universal norm to the effect 
that, although it is bad to treat members of one’s own group 
badly, it’s good (or at least not so bad) to treat members of 
other groups badly. And it also helps explain the continuing 
prevalence of warfare and ethnic cleansing, despite everyone’s 
protestations that these are bad things.  
In case this reason for conforming to the normative code 
leaves one deeply uncomfortable (as well it might), there seem 
to be two further reasons why one might choose to be good. 
First, it often feels good to do good, and it often feels bad to do 
bad (we call the latter feeling a guilty conscience). To some 
extent this follows from applying the principles of esteem to 
oneself. Doing something good raises one’s esteem not only in 
the eyes of others, but also in one’s own. And then, in 
accordance with behavior of evolutionary antiquity, the 
resulting sense of well-being leads one to hold oneself higher. 
Thus the cognitive system has cleverly built internal reasons 
into us—in addition to the threat of being shunned—that 
incline us to behave in accordance with the moral code. My 
understanding of the literature on psychopaths is that they 
lack this sense: they understand the moral code, but they 
derive neither pleasure from conforming to it nor guilt from 
violating it. 
Even this reason for doing good may strike one as not 
noble enough. A more transcendental motivation for doing good 
might be simply “doing the right thing,” in all humility, 
regardless of the cost to oneself. Most people probably act out of 
this motive only occasionally. Alexander observes that we call 
people who act primarily out of these motives saints,35 and they 
are vanishingly rare. 
  
 35 Id. at 103. 
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V. THE LOGIC OF RIGHTS, OBLIGATIONS, AUTHORITY, AND 
LAWS 
We now turn to the logic of laws. The part of a legal 
system relevant for present purposes consists of a system of 
obligations and rights sanctioned by and enforced by the state. 
In order to analyze the logic of laws, we must therefore start 
with the logic of obligations and rights.36  
An obligation involves two characters: an actor who is 
under obligation to perform some action, and a beneficiary to 
whom the actor is obliged and who stands to benefit from the 
actor’s performing the action. The operative inference that 
makes a situation an obligation is (16); this is a special case of 
the general formula for social norms in (1). 
(16) Actor is obligated to Beneficiary to do action X = 
 If Actor does not do action X, Beneficiary acquires the right to do 
some action Y (the Sanction) that is harmful to Actor. 
That is, if the Actor does not fulfill the obligation, the 
Beneficiary may or may not sanction the Actor. Moreover, if the 
Beneficiary does so, the Actor accepts this as okay, following 
the principles in (12) for commitment to a norm. (Or more 
subtly, the Actor is obligated to accept this as okay.)  
Rights are a bit more ramified. One version involves a 
Right-holder and a potential action by this person from which 
s/he stands to benefit. A right of this sort, which I will call an 
active right, has the inference pattern (17). 
(17) Right-holder has an active right to do action X = 
 If a person P (the Violator) prevents Right-holder from doing 
action X, Right-holder acquires the right to do some action Y 
(the Sanction) that is harmful to Violator.  
In (17), the Violator may be a specific person against whom the 
Right-holder holds the right (as in a tenant’s rights against a 
landlord), or the Violator may be anybody (as in a right to free 
speech).  
In another sort of right, which I call a passive right, the 
holder of the right is protected against harmful actions by 
someone else: 
  
 36 I disregard the type of law that establishes an institution, say the Parks 
Commission. What is interesting for our purposes is the part of the law that goes on to 
say what the Parks Commission does. 
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(18) Right-holder has a passive right concerning action X, potentially 
harmful to Right-holder = 
 If a person P (the Violator) performs action X, Right-holder 
acquires the right to do some action Y (the Sanction) that is 
harmful to Violator. 
Again, the Violator may be a particular person (as in a 
restraining order, where the Right-holder has the right not to 
be disturbed by the Violator), or the Violator may be anybody 
(as in a right to privacy). The contrast between active and 
passive rights shows up grammatically in the form of the 
complement of the word right: an active right is typically 
expressed as a right to do X, and a passive right as a right not 
to be X-ed.  
Notice that this system is completely self-referential. 
Violation of either an obligation or a right confers a right on 
the person violated, and the Violator is obligated to accept the 
Sanction if it is imposed. Furthermore, suppose an Actor is 
obligated to a Beneficiary to do something. Then, because the 
Beneficiary stands to benefit, s/he is harmed by the Actor’s 
nonperformance, and therefore s/he has a passive right to have 
the Actor perform.37 In short, there is no way to define 
obligations and rights independently of this network of 
inferences.  
One can acquire obligations and rights in various ways. 
The two are different in how one acquires them because of the 
asymmetry in who stands to benefit from the action.  
• One can impose an obligation on oneself, for instance by making 
a promise to someone.  
• One can grant others rights against oneself. For instance, 
offering to do an action X gives the person to whom the offer was 
made the right to demand that the action be performed.  
• One cannot grant oneself a right. One can claim or assert a 
right, but in order to exercise a right, it has to be assented to by 
the person against whom it is held.38 
• Obligations and rights can be conferred by an authority such as 
parents, teachers, bosses, or the state. An order to do something 
is the imposition of an obligation by an authority. Permission to 
do something is the granting of a right by an authority. 
  
 37 See JULIUS STONE, HUMAN LAW AND HUMAN JUSTICE 296 (1965) (noting 
the reciprocity of obligations and passive rights). 
 38 This pertains even to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which is 
a claim of rights for everyone against all the governments of the world. 
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In addition, the logic of rights and obligations itself provides a 
way to acquire new rights and obligations: 
• A Beneficiary of an obligation acquires a right to impose a 
Sanction on an Actor who has not performed. A Right-holder 
acquires a right to impose a Sanction on a Violator. A non-
performing Actor in an obligation and a Violator of a right 
acquire an obligation to accept a Sanction.  
Two other important sources of rights and obligations are 
ownership and agreement for cooperative action: 
• Ownership of an object consists of a bundle of rights: (a) the 
right to use the object, (b) the right to regulate the use of the 
object by others (i.e. to confer rights and obligations on them), 
and (c) the right to give the object away (i.e. to confer these 
rights on someone else).39 So one way to acquire rights is to 
acquire ownership of an object. 
• When two people agree to engage in a cooperative action, they 
thereby undertake obligations to each other to perform their 
respective parts of the action. This mutual obligation is crucial 
to contracts (including marriages). But it is much broader, 
extending to mundane activities like holding a conversation, in 
which there is a tacit mutual obligation not to conclude except 
by mutual agreement. 
Consider further the nature of authority. Adding to the 
incestuous character of the system, authority basically consists 
of the right to confer obligations and rights, and the right to 
impose sanctions. Thus the question naturally arises of how 
this right arises. Here are several possibilities: 
• Parents are taken to have a “natural” authority over their 
children.  
• Authority may be granted by a higher authority that has 
jurisdiction over both Actor and Beneficiary of an obligation or 
right. For example, a judge’s authority is established by the 
state; a CEO’s authority is established by the Board.  
• The highest level of authority, the state or the church (which in 
many cases historically have been the same thing) may claim 
authority from God.  
• Or it may claim authority from the “consent of the governed,” in 
which case the legal system takes itself to be viewed as a matter 
of mutual agreement on cooperative activity (“We, the people”).  
  
 39 Frank Snare, The Concept of Property, 9 AM. PHIL. Q. 200, 202-04 (1972). 
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• Alternatively, authority may be imposed through threat of force. 
In this case, the norms of the legal system are not so much 
accepted as adhered to on utilitarian grounds, as a way of 
avoiding punishment. Even so, the official face of the legal 
system may be one of “representing the people’s will.”  
Now we are finally ready to look at the form of laws. 
The general form of legal obligations and rights is a special 
mediated case of ordinary obligations and rights, in which the 
sanctions on a violator are regulated by the state (or other 
organization such as a church, club, or union): 
(19) Actor has a legal obligation to Beneficiary to do action X = 
 If Actor does not do action X, Beneficiary acquires the right to 
request the state (or its authorized representatives) to do action 
Y (the Sanction), which is harmful to Actor. 
(20) Right-holder has a legal active right to do action X = 
 If a person P (Violator) prevents Right-holder from doing action 
X, Right-holder acquires the right to request the state (or its 
authorized representatives) to do action Y (the Sanction), which 
is harmful to Violator. 
(21) Right-holder has a legal passive right concerning action X, 
potentially harmful to Right-holder = 
 If a person P (Violator) performs action X, Right-holder acquires 
the right to request the state (or its authorized representatives) 
to do action Y (the Sanction), which is harmful to Violator. 
(19)-(21) state the right in question as involving a 
request to the state. A stronger version would state it in terms 
of a demand to the state, whereby the state is then obligated to 
consider the status of the alleged violation.  
A special case of (19)-(21) is when the state itself is one 
of the characters involved. Tax laws and (for instance) laws 
against the drinking of alcohol establish an individual’s 
obligations to the state. Habeas corpus and Social Security are 
among an individual’s passive rights against the state, as well 
as the state’s obligations to the individual. Freedom of religion 
is an individual’s active right against the state as well as 
against other individuals.  
VI. SUMMARY SO FAR: COMPARISON OF MORALS AND LAWS 
As discussed at the outset, morals and obligations are 
both particular cases of social norms. Having a right does not 
fall under the strict definition of social norms, in that the 
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Right-holder is not the one punished if the right is violated. 
However, rights can be construed as social norms if they are 
rephrased as prohibitions from infringing on the action or state 
of the Right-holder. Laws, as a particular case of obligations 
and rights, then also fall under social norms. 
Morals, obligations and rights, and laws differ in their 
consequences. In the case of morals (and other normative 
values), the consequences of good behavior are approval or even 
admiration by all members of the community; the consequences 
of bad behavior are disapproval or indignation from all 
members of the community. One’s good and bad acts 
amalgamate with other aspects of one’s behavior and status to 
help determine how community members treat him or her.  
In the case of obligations and rights, the consequences 
of violations are further obligations and rights. The Beneficiary 
of an obligation and the Holder of a right acquire the right to 
sanction the Violator, and the Violator acquires an obligation to 
accept the Sanction. The difference between obligations and 
morals can be made clearer through the example of promises. If 
I make a promise to you to do some action, I have in effect 
undertaken an obligation to you to perform the action, and you 
are the Beneficiary of my obligation. If I fail to perform, you 
acquire the right to sanction me in some specific fashion. But in 
addition, because breaking promises is a moral violation, 
everyone is entitled to think less of me.40 In other words, 
promises partake of the character of obligations and morality. 
Laws are special cases of obligations and rights, 
conferred on individuals by the state and regulated and 
enforced by the state. Because (at least in some forms of 
government) they purport to be imposed by the community as a 
whole, they come closer to morals than do ordinary obligations 
and rights. On the other hand, the consequences of violations 
differ: for moral violations, the consequences are the 
community’s disapproval and indignation; for legal violations, 
an obligation to accept specifically spelled out sanctions.  
Another important difference between morals and laws 
is in their explicitness. As observed earlier, moral principles 
may or may not be explicit; moral judgments are often made 
intuitively, and justification of moral judgments is often post 
  
 40 The philosophical literature does not always recognize this difference. See, 
e.g., Jay Conison, The Pragmatics of Promise, 10 CAN. J. L. & JUR., 273, 321-22 (1997). 
It is, however, noticed by von Wright. GEORG HENRIK VON WRIGHT, NORM AND ACTION: 
A LOGICAL ENQUIRY 11-12, 92, 99 (1963). 
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hoc.41 Children acquire the local moral principles in part by 
observation, in part by explicit teaching, and, if recent thinking 
in moral psychology is on the right track, in part through 
innate inclinations or “moral instinct.”42 The origin of moral 
principles is unclear; they often seem to be timeless, and they 
are often attributed to supernatural sources such as gods or 
ancestors. Moral principles often seem to need no justification; 
they present themselves as “the way things ought to be.”  
By contrast, laws are by their nature explicit, legal 
judgments are (at least in principle) made through conscious 
deliberation, and their justification is (at least in principle) 
rationally based on explicit principles. People acquire 
knowledge of the local legal system through explicit education. 
Each law has a specific origin; its codification can be traced to 
particular individuals at particular times. Laws call for 
justification, reasons why they exist; and laws, unlike morals, 
can be repealed. 
VII. SHOULD THE LAW CARE ABOUT MORALITY? 
With all this in place, we can now return to the initial 
question: “Are morals universal, and should the law care?” 
Having established that morals are not universal, we need not 
dwell on the first part of the question. The second part of the 
question, however, is multiply ambiguous and requires some 
exegesis.  
First, I take it that the question involves a metonymy: 
the law, being a set of statements, can’t itself care about 
anything. It is the people who make and enforce laws that 
might or might not care.  
Second, there is an ambiguity in the word should, which 
has at least two value-laden readings. One appears in You 
should write your aunt a thank-you note. This is the normative 
reading: it specifies what is moral and/or socially appropriate. 
Another appears in It’s going to rain, so you should take an 
umbrella. This is the utilitarian reading: it makes a prediction 
of costs and benefits. Thus the second question might be 
paraphrased as either (22a) or (22b).  
(22) . . . and should the law care? 
  
 41 See supra Part IV. 
 42 See, e.g., Alexander, supra note 30, at 130-39; Boyd & Richerson, supra 
note 31, at 380; Doris & Stich, supra note 18, at 127-28; Hauser, supra note 4, at 258-
59; Haidt, supra note 17, at 1001; Mikhail, supra note 4, at 143-44. 
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 a. Normative reading: 
  Is it right for those who make and enforce the law to care?  
 b. Utilitarian reading: 
  Is it beneficial for those who make and enforce the law to 
care? 
Third, “should the law care?” is not specific about what 
the law should care about. (23) offers three interpretations. 
Since we have established that morality is not universal, we 
can disregard (23b) in favor of (23b’). 
(23) a. Should those who make and enforce the law care about 
morality? 
 b. Should those who make and enforce the law care whether 
morality is universal?  [irrelevant] 
 b’. Should those who make and enforce the law care that 
morality is not universal? 
Since should can be understood in either normative or 
utilitarian terms in both (23a) and (23b’), we have four versions 
of the question to deal with.  
Let’s start with (23a). One way to understand this is 
whether it is important for the law to track morality. Should it 
attempt to replicate morality or should it be indifferent to the 
dictates of morality? Law and morality regulate many of the 
same issues that are involved in keeping a society operating, so 
it should be no surprise that they often overlap in their 
application. The issue is whether this overlap should be a 
deliberate concern.  
The normative reading of this question is (24). 
(24) Is it right for those who make and enforce the law to attempt to 
replicate morality? 
Different societies have different answers. In societies governed 
by religious law, the answer has been that it is right for the law 
to replicate morality. It seems to me that in such societies there 
is a partial fusion of morality and law (or lack of differentiation 
between them). Here in the United States, the answer is not so 
clear, which is why we’re engaging in writing this special issue. 
In particular, the separation of church and state makes it 
possible to decouple religiously-governed morality and law, and 
we take this to be normatively right. Still, the founding 
documents of the United States explicitly attempt to track so-
called “natural rights,” which basically set forth a moral stance.  
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The utilitarian version of (23a) is (25). 
(25) Is it beneficial for those who make and enforce the law to 
attempt to replicate morality? 
One answer was provided by an audience member at the 
symposium from which this special issue is derived: laws that 
violate commonly held morals are not conducive to widespread 
compliance or enforcement—consider Prohibition or present-
day marijuana laws. So to that extent it is beneficial for laws to 
track morality.  
However, there is a deeper question here: beneficial to 
whom? And what kind of benefit? The answer might well come 
out differently depending whether we are interested in the 
well-being of all individuals, that of a particular class of 
individuals, or that of the state as a whole, which might be 
measured in terms of its smooth function (e.g. keeping crime 
and unrest down). And it might well also depend on whether 
we are concerned with emotional well-being, with health, with 
economic well-being, or with some combination thereof. In the 
case of the well-being of the state, we might also ask whether 
the benefits to be sought include political and/or military 
domination over other states. So presto, before we can even 
decide what question we’re asking, we find ourselves in a 
thicket of longstanding burning questions in political 
philosophy. And all of these require decisions among normative 
and utilitarian motives as well. So I drop this thread of inquiry 
here. 
Now consider the other major interpretation of the 
initial question, namely (23b’) “Should those who make and 
enforce the law care that morality is not universal?” Here we 
are asking about the status of laws such as the French ban on 
headscarves in schools, which violates the Islamic sense of 
morality, and the law of the Catholic Church banning the 
ordination of women, which violates some people’s moral sense 
of gender equality. For that matter, we might be asking about 
the status of laws regulating abortion and gay marriage, which 
track some people’s morality and violate others’. A possible 
elaboration of this question, then, would be (26): 
(26) a. Should those who make and enforce laws favor some moral 
codes over others? And if so, which ones? 
 b. Or should they strive to take account of multiple, potentially 
conflicting moralities within the community to which the 
laws apply? 
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(26), like (23a), can be differentiated into two readings, 
depending on the interpretation of should. The answer to the 
normative reading of (26) is again that it depends on the 
society. Some societies have norms that lead to legal tolerance 
of multiple moralities; others have norms that lead to legal 
intolerance of moralities other than that of the politically 
dominant culture. And again, the utilitarian reading of (26) 
demands an answer to the question: Whom do you intend the 
system to benefit?  
VIII. INCONCLUSION 
In order to stress the range of possible relations 
between morality and the law, I have mentioned quite a few 
examples of real normative and legal principles that I (and I 
presume many readers) find strange or even disagreeable. 
Presumably, within contemporary American secular culture, 
where we reject many such norms, the possibilities we are 
actually inclined to consider is correspondingly narrowed a 
great deal. We are not ready to consider a legal system based 
on, say, fundamentalist religion. Of course, in a society built 
around fundamentalist religion, as we have seen, the range of 
possibilities is narrower still. But even with the narrowing that 
we approve of, the issue of morality and the law constantly 
flares up in discussions of abortion, gay marriage, and the 
teaching of evolution. My impression is that typically the left 
and the right each basically favor a coupling between the law 
and morality—but their own morality.  
More generally, an answer to whether laws should be 
coupled to morality partly depends on how norms, including 
norms about laws, are to be grounded within a society that 
does not rely on a particular God’s authority. I don’t believe 
there has been a coherent solution. Rawls, for example, 
proposes the doctrine of “justice as fairness,” arguing that this 
is what people would want to adopt, given the proper 
circumstances.43 But that is not the same as being able to say 
what they should adopt, in either the normative or utilitarian 
senses.  
Mahlmann discusses several modern positions that have 
concluded that the only possible foundation for law is the 
  
 43 RAWLS, supra note 5, at 11. 
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threat of force.44 He shows why they are unsatisfactory, and not 
just for their unappetizing conclusions.45 For the most part, I 
don’t find that people opposing the religious fundamentalists, 
such as Dawkins, really try to offer a grounding for norms; they 
just assert their own moral codes and point out the 
contradictions and vast helpings of self-interest in the religion-
based position.46 
I am not so sure that an evolutionary theory of social 
cognition can provide a proper grounding for values either, 
although perhaps it can offer some insights into sources of 
difficulty, as I have attempted here. For instance, Dawkins 
shows that biologically driven values do not always coincide 
with morality.47 His way of putting this conclusion is that our 
rationality can free us from the dictates of our genes.48 But 
appealing to rationality or science to tell us which course we 
ought to follow implicitly assumes some particular normative 
or utilitarian goal for how we want society to be. Again this 
raises the question of whose interests we think the system 
ought to serve, and how an answer to that question is justified.  
At this point it seems appropriate to stop. 
  
 44 Matthias Mahlmann, Law and Force: Twentieth Century Radical Legal 
Philosophy, Post-Modernism and the Foundations of Law, 9 RES PUBLICA 19, 19 (2003). 
 45 Id. at 20-21. 
 46 RICHARD DAWKINS, THE GOD DELUSION (2006). 
 47 RICHARD DAWKINS, THE SELFISH GENE 139 (2d ed. 1989).  
 48 Id. 
